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     NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
Nos. 04-9017 & 04-9018
IN RE:  MARTIN HORN,
JOSEPH MAZURKIEWICZ, and GEORGE R. WHITE,
  Petitioners at No. 04-9017
DONALD HARDCASTLE
v.
MARTIN HORN, Pennsylvania Department of Corrections;
GEORGE R. WHITE, Superintendent of the
State Correctional Institution at Pittsburgh;
JOSEPH P. MAZURKIEWICZ, Superintendent of the
State Correctional Institution at Rockview,
  Appellants at No. 04-9018
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
D.C. Civil Action No. 98-cv-3028
(Honorable John R. Padova)
Submitted on Petition for Writ of Mandamus Under Rule 21, Fed. R. App. P.
and Appellee’s Motion to Dismiss Appeal for Lack of Jurisdiction
May 18, 2006
2Before:  SCIRICA, Chief Judge, AMBRO and ALDISERT, Circuit Judges.
(Filed June 23, 2006)
OPINION OF THE COURT
PER CURIAM.
These consolidated matters involve an interlocutory appeal and a petition for a writ
of mandamus brought by the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania in a capital habeas corpus
proceeding.  Specifically, the Commonwealth seeks to challenge a discovery order issued
by the District Court at the request of Donald Hardcastle, who seeks habeas corpus relief
on a claim of racial discrimination in jury selection under Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S.
79 (1986).  After the Commonwealth attempted to invoke this Court’s appellate and
mandamus jurisdiction, the District Court vacated the challenged discovery order and
entered a new order in complete accord with the parties’ agreement.
For the following reasons, we agree with Hardcastle that we lack appellate
jurisdiction to review the challenged discovery order and will grant his motion to dismiss
the Commonwealth’s appeal.  We also agree with Hardcastle that the Commonwealth’s
mandamus petition is moot and will deny it as such.
I. Background
In 1982, a Philadelphia jury found Donald Hardcastle guilty of two counts of first
degree murder.  The trial court imposed a sentence of death.  The Pennsylvania Supreme
3Court affirmed Hardcastle’s conviction and sentence, Commonwealth v. Hardcastle, 546
A.2d 1101 (Pa. 1988), and subsequently affirmed the denial of state post-conviction
relief, Commonwealth v. Hardcastle, 701 A.2d 541 (Pa. 1998).
On federal habeas corpus review, the District Court granted relief on Hardcastle’s
Batson claim alleging that Judith Rubino, the assistant district attorney who conducted
jury selection at his trial, exercised her peremptory strikes in a racially discriminatory
manner in violation of the Equal Protection Clause.  On appeal, we agreed with the
District Court that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s rejection of Hardcastle’s Batson
claim was objectively unreasonable based on the current record.  Hardcastle v. Horn, 368
F.3d 246, 250 (3d Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 1081 (2005).  We concluded,
however, that the Commonwealth had been denied an opportunity in the District Court to
present evidence in support of its position, and remanded for a hearing and reexamination
of Hardcastle’s Batson claim.  Id.
On remand, Hardcastle moved for discovery of “any and all notes generated by
[Rubino] regarding the jury selection proceedings in [Hardcastle’s] trial that are in [the
Commonwealth’s] actual or constructive possession or control.”  (Discovery Mot. ¶ 3.a.) 
Hardcastle also moved to discover Rubino’s jury selection notes in other homicide
prosecutions and various documents regarding the District Attorney’s jury selection
policies and practices while Rubino served as a prosecutor, and to take Rubino’s
deposition prior to the hearing.  In response, the Commonwealth expressly agreed to
4provide Rubino’s notes from jury selection in Hardcastle’s case, but objected to the
remaining requests as overbroad, burdensome, and/or not relevant.
By order entered August 18, 2004, the District Court granted Hardcastle’s
discovery motion over the Commonwealth’s objections.  On August 27, 2004, the
Commonwealth challenged the discovery order by filing a petition for writ of mandamus
(No. 04-9017) and a notice of appeal (No. 04-9018).  By order entered September 10,
2004, the District Court vacated its prior discovery order entirely, then granted discovery
only of Rubino’s notes from jury selection in Hardcastle’s case, i.e., the portion of
Hardcastle’s request to which the Commonwealth expressly agreed.  The District Court
has conducted no further proceedings.
After consolidating the Commonwealth’s appeal and mandamus petition, the Clerk
instructed the parties to show cause why the cases should not be dismissed as moot in
light of the District Court’s September 10, 2004 order.  We have received the parties’
responses reflecting the Commonwealth’s belief that the cases are not moot.  Hardcastle
in turn moves to dismiss the cases for lack of jurisdiction, or in the alternative for an
expedited briefing schedule.
II. Discussion
From a practical perspective, the resolution of the current matters is simple
because nothing remains for us to adjudicate.  The Commonwealth agreed, and still
     In response to the Clerk’s suggestion of mootness, the Commonwealth reiterates that1
it “does not object to pre-hearing discovery of the prosecutory’s jury selection notes in
this case.”  (Commonwealth’s Response at n.1.)
5
agrees,  to produce Rubino’s notes from jury selection in Hardcastle’s case.  The District1
Court’s second discovery order of September 10, 2004, requires nothing more.  We could
not provide the Commonwealth any relief beyond that which the District Court has
already fashioned.  For all practical purposes, then, these matters are moot.  See Donovan
ex rel. Donovan v. Punxsutawney Area Sch. Bd., 336 F.3d 211, 216 (3d Cir. 2003) (citing
County of Morris v. Nationalist Movement, 273 F.3d 527, 533 (3d Cir. 2001) (“The
ability to grant effective relief lies at the heart of the mootness doctrine.”)).
Notwithstanding, the Commonwealth maintains that these matters are not moot. 
The Commonwealth argues that the District Court’s first discovery order of August 18,
2004, is still valid, and that its second discovery order is a nullity.  Invoking the general
notion that filing a notice of appeal divests a district court of jurisdiction, see Venen v.
Sweet, 758 F.2d 117, 120 (3d Cir. 1985), the Commonwealth contends that the District
Court lacked the authority to vacate its first discovery order.
Before addressing the Commonwealth’s argument, we pause to question why the
Commonwealth invokes this general rule in an attempt to invalidate the second discovery
order.  After all, the second discovery order embodies the precise terms to which the
Commonwealth agreed.  The Commonwealth could have avoided considerable expense
and delay if it had voluntarily withdrawn its appeal and mandamus petition as soon as the
6District Court vacated the challenged order.  The Commonwealth’s response indicates a
different strategy, however:
This issue has also arisen with ever-increasing frequency in other cases. 
Hardcastle’s institutional counsel, who represent virtually every death-
sentenced Pennsylvania prisoner in federal court, now routinely ask for
similar discovery in support of Batson claims that were rejected, or not
litigated, in the state courts. . . . The Commonwealth has a strong interest in
having this Court set guidelines for such requests – a decision by this Court
will save taxpayer money and conserve the Commonwealth’s limited
resources, while allowing district judges to focus on other issues.
(Commonwealth’s Mootness Response at 5-6 (emphasis added).)  This response suggests
an invitation for us to issue an advisory opinion on the scope of discovery for Batson
claims.  Because we are not in the business of issuing advisory opinions, we decline the
Commonwealth’s invitation.  See Magaziner v. Montemuro, 468 F.2d 782, 784 (3d Cir.
1972) (quoting Wright, Federal Courts, § 12 at 37) (“The oldest and most consistent
thread in the federal law of justiciability is that the federal courts will not give advisory
opinions.”).
Whatever its strategy, the Commonwealth is correct that filing a notice of appeal
generally divests a district court of jurisdiction.  The Commonwealth neglects to explain,
however, that a district court does not lose jurisdiction when a notice of appeal is filed
from an order or judgment which is not appealable.  See Venen, 758 F.2d at 121.  An
appeal from such an order is “a nullity.”  Id.  Otherwise, a litigant could temporarily
“deprive a district court of jurisdiction at any non-critical or critical juncture including
7trial itself, thus bringing proceedings in the district court to a standstill while a non-
appealable ruling wends its way through the appellate process.”  Id.
For purposes of determining our appellate jurisdiction, then, the question is
whether the District Court’s August 18, 2004 discovery order is an immediately
appealable order.  If not, we lack jurisdiction and must dismiss the appeal.  While a
discovery order is not a final order subject to appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, it may in
narrow circumstances be appealable under the collateral order doctrine.  See ADAPT of
Phila. v. Phila. Hous. Auth., 417 F.3d 390, 394 (3d Cir. 2005).  The collateral order
doctrine provides that “[a]n appeal of a nonfinal order will lie if (1) the order from which
the appellant appeals conclusively determines the disputed question; (2) the order resolves
an important issue that is completely separate from the merits of the dispute; and (3) the
order is effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment.”  Bacher v. Allstate
Ins. Co., 211 F.3d 52, 53 (3d Cir. 2000).
This Court’s jurisprudence establishes that the requirements of the collateral order
doctrine are met “when a party appeals a discovery order involving information which the
party claims to be privileged or to constitute a trade secret.”  Id.  These privileges include
the attorney-client privilege and the work product privilege.  In re Ford Motor Co., 110
F.3d 954, 962-63 (3d Cir. 1997).  In its petition for mandamus relief filed in this Court,
the Commonwealth posits “a privilege problem.”  According to the Commonwealth,
8Rubino’s jury selection notes are “encompassed by the ‘work product privilege’” and thus
not subject to discovery.
Hardcastle counters that the Commonwealth did not claim the work product
privilege or any other privilege in its response to his discovery motion.  In that motion,
Hardcastle requested discovery of Rubino’s jury selection notes in his trial, her jury
selection notes in all other homicide trials in which she conducted jury selection, and
documents regarding jury selection policies and practices by the Philadelphia District
Attorney’s Office.  He also asked to depose Rubino prior to any evidentiary hearing. 
Nothing in the Commonwealth’s response suggests that any item or request is protected
from discovery by the work product privilege or any other privilege.  For this reason,
Hardcastle believes that the Commonwealth did not properly claim the work product
privilege.
Hardcastle’s point is well taken.  Presumably, if the Commonwealth had expressly
claimed the work product privilege, the District Court would have addressed the
applicability of the privilege.  If so, the District Court could have examined each of the
requested discovery items and decided which, if any, were discoverable.  If the
Commonwealth had then filed an interlocutory appeal from such a decision, we could
readily determine our appellate jurisdiction under the collateral order doctrine.  We could
also readily determine whether the Commonwealth would be entitled to any relief from
the discovery order.
9In response, the Commonwealth points to a reference in the District Court record
as proof that it invoked the work product privilege.  A thorough review of the record
confirms that when Hardcastle filed his amended habeas petition in November 1999, he
indicated that he would seek discovery similar to that requested in his discovery motion. 
(Amended Pet. at 80 n.42; 81-82 n.43; 82-83 n.44.)  In its answer to the amended petition,
the Commonwealth asserted that any discovery requests were premature and without
merit.  (Answer at 133.)  In his reply, Hardcastle reiterated his discovery requests.  (Reply
at 120 n.100; 121 n.102.)  In its surreply, the Commonwealth challenged any discovery
requests as irrelevant, non-existent, and premature because no formal discovery motion
had been filed.  In a footnote, the Commonwealth stated that no discovery should be
granted because the Batson claim is meritless and Rubino’s notes are protected as
attorney work product.  (Surreply at 29 n.9.)
A brief examination of discovery procedures in habeas proceedings demonstrates
that the Commonwealth’s unexplained reference to the work product privilege – tucked in
a footnote in a lengthy document filed years before any formal discovery request was
made – is insufficient to claim the privilege.  In habeas proceedings in the district courts,
the initial disclosure rules regarding discovery do not apply.  See Fed. R. Civ. P.
26(a)(1)(E)(ii).  Rather, the district judge “may, for good cause, authorize a party to
conduct discovery under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and may limit the extent of
discovery.”  Rule 6(a) of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases; see Mayberry v.
10
Petsock, 821 F.2d 179, 185 (3d Cir. 1987) (stating that prior court approval for discovery
is required under Rule 6(a)).  A party seeking discovery in a habeas proceeding must
make specific requests and must provide reasons for the requests.  See Rule 6(b).
Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, as referenced in Rule 6(a), a party
claiming that discovery material is privileged as work product “shall make the claim
expressly and shall describe the nature” of the requested material.  Fed. R. Civ. P.
26(b)(5).  The party requesting such material bears the burden of showing that he “has
substantial need of the materials” and “is unable without undue hardship to obtain the
substantial equivalent of the materials by other means.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3).  The
district court, in ordering discovery of privileged materials, “shall protect against
disclosure of the mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal theories” of an
attorney concerning the litigation.  Id.
Here, in his discovery motion, Hardcastle made specific discovery requests, as
described previously; he also provided reasons for those requests.  In its sixteen-page
response, the Commonwealth did not suggest that any document is protected from
discovery by the work product privilege, much less “claim it expressly,” as Rule 26(b)(5)
requires.  Because the Commonwealth did not properly claim the privilege, the District
Court did not examine any of the documents to decide which portions (if any) were
     We do not decide whether the Commonwealth waived the privilege by failing to2
claim it properly in the District Court.  Although the parties have agreed to the scope of
discovery, it is conceivable that Hardcastle will later request further discovery to prove
his Batson claim.  If so, and if the Commonwealth claims the privilege, the District Court
can decide in the first instance whether the Commonwealth waived the privilege.
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protected from discovery as work product.   Because the Commonwealth did not2
sufficiently claim the privilege, the District Court’s August 18, 2004 discovery order is
not immediately appealable under the collateral order doctrine.  In the absence of an
immediately appealable discovery order, we lack appellate jurisdiction.  Accordingly, we
will grant Hardcastle’s motion and will dismiss the Commonwealth’s appeal.
The remaining issue of the Commonwealth’s mandamus petition is easily resolved. 
In the absence of an effective appeal, the District Court retained jurisdiction on
September 10, 2004, to vacate its August 18, 2004 order and to issue a new discovery
order.  Thus, the District Court’s second discovery order is valid.  The order requires
nothing more from the Commonwealth than that to which it expressly agreed.  Because
the District Court has already granted that which the Commonwealth requests, the
mandamus petition is moot.  We will grant Hardcastle’s request to deny it as such.
III. Conclusion
For these reasons, we will grant Hardcastle’s motion to dismiss the
Commonwealth’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction.  We will deny as moot the
Commonwealth’s petition for a writ of mandamus.
